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    "result": {"data":{"blog":{"content":"**In theory, it isn’t particularly new. The term zero trust [has been around for](https://dspace.stir.ac.uk/bitstream/1893/2010/1/Formalising%20trust%20as%20a%20computational%20concept.pdf) more than 55 years. **[De-perimeterisation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/De-perimeterisation)**, the main concept behind Zero Trust Architecture, was defined and promoted on the [Jericho Forums](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jericho_Forum), which was founded 20 years ago. Even the [management of risks associated with de-perimeterisation](http://www.ma.rhul.ac.uk/static/techrep/2009/RHUL-MA-2009-07.pdf) were discussed almost two decades ago. **[John Kindervag](https://www.linkedin.com/in/john-kindervag-40572b1/)** coined the concept while he was at Forrester in 2009, and Google implemented a Zero Trust Architecture framework, referred to as [BeyondCorp](https://beyondcorp.com/), in the same year. Even so, in practice Zero Trust should mean more, than just a marketing hype, especially given that **[Joe Biden has ordered](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/05/12/executive-order-on-improving-the-nations-cybersecurity/)** that “the Federal Government must adopt security best practices; advance toward Zero Trust Architecture”. The **[publication](https://www.nist.gov/publications/zero-trust-architecture)** of NIST can serve as both a theoretical and practical guideline, which should be applied to achieve worthwhile changes. But what are these theories and practices and why they are so important? Let’s take a look.**\n\n\n# What is Zero Trust?\n\nIt should be pointed out that Zero Trust is not a product, but a model. Though it can be facilitated by one or more products, it primarily necessitates a change in approach. Before, common sense was that a private network has definite perimeters with a small number of entry points, and the goal was to protect them. This way of thinking bears the strategic approach of the late medieval and early modern period. The defense of an area with definite boundaries and the assets concentrated behind the walls of the fortress. Both attacking and defending armies were mostly focused on the entry point, just like red and blue teams are focused on network defense tools in this castle-and-moat (network) security model. However, it is well-known, as it was in the medieval period, that there is a much easier and more profitable way than a siege, namely sabotage. In the castle-and-moat mode, if the authentication is circumvented at the entry point there are no other mechanisms to prevent malicious activity, as you are inside the perimeter. You are trusted if you are inside the perimeter – this could be the motto of any malware developer. Zero Trust Architecture is looking to overtake this old-fashioned perimeter approach. Before, there was a dogma that it was hard to obtain access to private resources from outside the private network, so successfully authenticated users could access any resources on the private network. In the age of virtual private networks (VPN) and cloud services, private resources can be obtained very easily from the internet, as there are no definite perimeters, with just a small number of entry points. This means that the way we defend the assets of the organization should change. Any access to any resources by any user or machine must be authenticated and authorized independently of whether the resource tried to be accessed from inside or outside of the organization’s private network. Zero Trust means that lack of authentication means no trust is given at all. Access can be given after successful authentication, but in a restricted manner, just like in real life. Network security is no different from other types of security: it uses the same tenets and learns from the history of them all, as discussed above.\n\n## Everything is a Resource\n\nZero Trust Architecture requires us to consider all data sources and computing services as resources, with no exceptions, even if the network might be composed of multiple classes of devices. Practically speaking, this means there should be one or more control points (Policy Enforcement Point) in the network where all the network traffic goes through and where the policy can be enforced. As a result, the castle-and-moat security model is completely inadequate. With Zero Trust, there is no resource concentration, no definite perimeters, and the focus is on the traffic paths of the communication instead of entry points.\n\nAs traffic paths can be controlled comprehensively in computer networks, there is no need to control the entry point itself. It is necessary to segment the network as much as possible and separate these segments from each other. This technique is known as micro-segmentation, as it creates several micro-perimeters or segments in the network. As the crossing between these micro segments are controlled and transit is permitted in a restricted manner, accurate authentication and authorization can be performed at the borders. The situation is the same as it is with real life borders, except that there are no – or at least there shouldn’t be –[green borders](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Green_border) in computer networks. [Lateral movement](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network_Lateral_Movement) cannot be performed in the network as it is no longer hierarchical, and there are no resources of distinct importance, as all resources are treated equally, meaning access to all resources is verified independently from the classification of the resource, just like any passengers are authenticated at the borders independently of whether the passenger is a particularly important person or not.\n\n\n## Secure Communication\n\nSecure communication is an essential part of the Zero Trust Security Model for several reasons. Secure communication provides confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity. Authenticity makes it possible for the communicating parties to identify each other, and also makes it possible for the Policy Engine to identify the source of communication. The Policy Engine can then make a decision about whether access can be granted to a resource for a given subject, which will be enforced at the Policy Enforcement Point. Confidentiality inhibits the passive attacker to get credentials or other valuable information by eavesdropping on the network, which can be used during an active attack. Integrity ensures that the communication cannot be altered without the knowledge of the communication parties, making it impossible to modify sensitive information, such as a bank account number or invoice amount, in order to add misleading information or fishing for part of the original content. \n\n\n## Session Based Access\n\nAccording to the Zero Trust tenets, access to the resources are granted in a session-based manner. Both authentication and authorization are session-based, and the users must be granted only the level of access needed to fulfill their role, which means we must follow the [least privilege principle](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_least_privilege). A session-based approach guarantees a time limitation, as the access to a resource is not necessarily granted in a subsequent session or with the same privileges, as privileges should also be limited to those that are strictly necessary, session by session.\n\n\n## Strictly Enforced Authentication and Authorization\n\nAs has already been mentioned, the basic concept is that no one is trusted by default from either inside or outside the network. Authentication and authorization are always checked at each access request before access is granted to an organizational resource, though a question arises of how a user can be authenticated. The most-used authentication mechanisms are indirect, meaning they cannot supply direct evidence to the user’s identity, just certain factors such as something the user knows (knowledge), something the user has (possession) or something the user is (inherence), assuming the exclusivity of knowledge, possession, or inherence. Single factor, like a password might be compromised, but the probability of compromising multiple factors with different type is negligibly low, which is why it is so important to use multi-factor authentication.\n\nOne fundamental problem of identification by knowledge is that if it is unchanged over a long time, just like a password or a certificate, and becomes compromised, it does not identify the user, yet the abuse is hard to detect. Credentials that change over a short period of time, such as a [Time-based One-Time Password](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Time-based_One-Time_Password) (TOTP) are one option, but this solution cannot solve the problem on its own, as an attacker who has stolen the shared secret, which is also a long-term credential, can generate a valid TOTP. However, combined with a possession-based factor, this can help to identify the human itself instead of just their knowledge. This is especially true when accessing the TOTP generator with [software](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Software_token) or [hardware](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security_token) tokens that can be accessed after an inherence-based identification, such as unlocking a mobile device or a security token by fingerprint.\n\nHowever, for the user, or client in general, identification is just one factor in dynamic polices. The identification process can also encompass any associated attributes assigned by the enterprise to an account. Characteristics of the device used by the client, such as software versions installed, patch level, network or physical location, time and date of request and previously observed behavior, can also be part of the verification of a client and can also determine the applied policy. Behavioral attributes can also be measured, and deviations can be checked against the observed usage patterns before access is granted to a particular resource. The sensitivity and the classification of the resource should also vary according to the conditions of the resource access. For instance, under certain circumstances only read-only access is granted to a particular resource, but after additional authentication, by a second or a third factor, read-write access can be provided. The situation here is the same as it is in physical security, where entering a higher classified place requires additional authentication. In terms of network and data security, higher data acts like a location in physical security. \n\n\n## Monitoring devices in real-time\n\nEstablishing a continuous diagnostics and mitigation (CDM) system is also a requirement of Zero Trust Architecture. Knowing the current security-related state of the network and the actors involved is essential, as restrictions should be applied on a client or a server when a security issue can be assumed to be related to them. For instance, if a device runs a service that has a remotely executable vulnerability which is currently unpatched, the access of the affected service should be limited until the service is patched to mitigate the vulnerability. To be able to do that, it is also necessary to have the information that there is a security issue in the organization. This information can come from a CDM system and may imply a change in the earlier mentioned dynamic policies once a security issue is recognized and subsequently fixed.\n\nAppearance of a new device on the network is a typical scenario where monitoring is essential, as rules must be applied to the network traffic of the newly appeared device. Zero Trust requires that we do not trust in a device just because it is inside the private network, so the rule could simply lead to a denial. However, it is also possible that only one path should be opened which makes possible to register the device on the network for the user, especially if it is a mobile or a bring your own device, which can access only a limited part of the network with limited privileges. Independently from the applied policies, the information about the fact that there is an unregistered device that has appeared on the network which tries to communicate is a must, as it could indicate a legitimate usage of the network, but also an illegitimate or at least a suspicious one.\n\nNot just the devices, but the network traffic they generate should also be monitored. As part of the incident management, during investigation we will need all available information. Before any incident occurs, changes in resource accesses may indicate a security issue. For instance, requesting a higher level of privilege during a resource access, like requesting writing permission instead of the ordinary read-only one, or requesting it from an unusual network location, like from a foreign country the organization has no connection with, at an unusual time, like at midnight in case of a colleague that works 9-to-5 , or trying to discover the network, may all indicate the presence of a malicious software that may generate input to the CDM, causing quarantine of the device to prevent the spread of ransomware, for instance.\n\n\n# Conclusion\n\nThe NIST does not articulate any requirements of network security in its Zero Trust publications that would not have already been articulated by others before, but it does so in a way that makes it possible to reach not only C-level executives, but also state leaders – as it has influenced the Biden Administration’s [plans for strengthening US cybersecurity](https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2021/06/08/biden-us-cybersecurity/). Leading technology research firms, such as Gartner and Forrester, also [promote the Zero Trust](https://www.gartner.com/smarterwithgartner/new-to-zero-trust-security-start-here/) model, which makes the concept almost unavoidable on providers’ side and also generates hype about the topic. Beyond business considerations, we should keep the basic statement of Zero Trust in mind: there could be attackers both inside and outside of the organization, so we should never simply trust, but always verify and enforce the principle of least privilege.\n\nIf you want to learn more about Balasys' Zero Trust solution, please download our [white paper](https://balasys.hu/static/2f6535a81e94abba1d9c142cc86d3220/PNS_UC_Zero_Trust_security_ENG_web03_aeaca83173.pdf), or visit our [solution page](https://www.balasys.hu/en/solutions/network-security/).\n","title":"Zero Trust: Is it anything new?","short_description":"What are the theories and practices and why they are so important? Let’s take a look.","author":"Szilárd Pfeiffer, Security Evangelist & Engineer, Balasys","date":"2021-09-16","hero":{"url":"https://balasysmediastorage.blob.core.windows.net/websiteimages/uploads/blog_header_2d283adf71.png"},"SEO":{"title":"Zero Trust: Is it anything new?","isIndexable":true,"description":"What are the theories and practices and why they are so important? Let’s take a look.","keywords":"zero trust, zero trust architecture","preview":{"url":"https://balasysmediastorage.blob.core.windows.net/websiteimages/uploads/bs_zero_trust_abra02_1d198030ba.svg"}}},"related":{"nodes":[{"author":"Szilárd Pfeiffer","avatar":{"url":"https://balasysmediastorage.blob.core.windows.net/websiteimages/uploads/jievani_weerasinghe_NHRM_1u4_GD_A_unsplash_5998edbcc5.jpg"},"content":"**Researchers at **[Kudelski Security](https://kudelskisecurity.com/)** have **[managed to break](https://research.kudelskisecurity.com/2023/03/06/polynonce-a-tale-of-a-novel-ecdsa-attack-and-bitcoin-tears/)** Bitcoin and Ethereum wallets using a novel attack against one of the most popular asymmetric key algorithms of modern cryptography. Although **[Satoshi Nakamoto](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Satoshi_Nakamoto)**’s wallet was not among the 764 wallets they were able to break, it is quite worrying to see that a software issue can make such a modern cryptographic algorithm like ECDSA vulnerable. Analysis of data that comes purely from open sources could reveal a practical weakness of an algorithm that is the fundamental basis of secure internet communication, public key infrastructures, and cryptocurrency transactions.**\n\n\n## Software Issue Behind the Scenes\n\nAs with many other times in the history of attacks against cryptographic algorithms, the cause of a successful attack is not a vulnerability in the algorithm itself, but the fact that poor-quality software used an algorithm with insufficient care. It is crucial to obtain “high-quality” random numbers during the calculation of many cryptographic operations. Such operations store passwords using [salt](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salt_(cryptography))ed [hash](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryptographic_hash_function)es, the generation of cryptographic keys used to authenticate web servers on the internet, or an employee before access is given to the company’s private network using a virtual private network (VPN) service. The generation of [digital signature](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_signature)s – which is necessary for the verification of the transactions – also requires a cryptographically strong random value. In the absence of strong random values, there would be a relation between the random and the private part of the signing key. This property could be exploited, and the private key can be acquired by an attacker. In the possession of the private key, any transaction related to the key can be verified, meaning that the balance of the wallet can be transferred.\n\n\n## Not a New Idea, but a New Method\n\nThough the attack itself is novel, the idea behind the attack is not so new. The lack of high-quality random numbers has caused serious vulnerabilities in the past. In 2002, a researcher found an [issue](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=cve-2008-0166) in the version of the [OpenSSL](https://www.openssl.org/) distributed with [Debian](https://www.debian.org/) Linux and its derivatives that reduced the entropy of generated random values. The issue caused SSH, VPN, and X.509 keys generated by the affected versions of OpenSSL to become vulnerable. Services still used a key generated by the affected version of the code which meant they remained vulnerable until the regeneration of the key. In 2010, a group called _fail0verflow _compromised an ECDSA key [Sony](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sony) used to sign software for the [PlayStation 3](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PlayStation_3) game console. The root cause of the attack was almost the same as it is now, namely Sony did not use different random numbers when digitally signing different software. The novelty of the current attack is that it exploits the high-degree relationships among the random values ([nonce](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryptographic_nonce)s) used to generate digital signatures. It means if the nonce was not generated by a cryptographically secure random number generator but using a weak [pseudo-random number generator](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pseudorandom_number_generator) (PRNG), it would allow the attacker to retrieve the private part of the key used to generate the signatures.\n\n\n## Special Kind of Open-source Intelligence\n\nThree prerequisites must be met to successfully retrieve the signer’s private key from signatures. The first one is that the random value used to generate the signature should come from a weak PRNG. The second one is to have a batch of consecutive digital signatures generated by using the same PRNG. The third one is that the signatures can be ordered, meaning that we know which signatures have been generated after which one. It could be assumed that there are implementations that use weak PRNGs as it is not basic knowledge whether random number generators are adequate for cryptographic purposes and some legacy software may follow older guidelines. The question is: where can an attacker find a consecutive and ordered list of signatures? The answer is: in several places. Digital signatures are part of each cryptographic protocol, so they can be collected from open sources. The best examples are [cryptocurrencies](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryptocurrency), where the transfers are validated by digital signatures. These digital signatures must be published to allow each party to validate the transactions. Basically, cryptocurrency [blockchain](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blockchain)s are huge collections of the necessary signatures. For instance, researchers could collect 763 million unique signatures from the Bitcoin blockchain which were generated by 424 million unique public keys. Most of the time a key was used to generate only a few signatures, but millions of keys generated at least four signatures, which is the minimum requirement of the attack.\n\n\n## Someone Got Ahead of the Researchers\n\nResearchers ran their attack for two days and 19 hours with an estimated cost of USD 265, resulting in 762 unique broken wallets, but someone may have gotten ahead of them, as all the wallets had zero balance. The researchers suspect that these wallets have already been hacked in the past. If they had not been hacked, 484 BTC could have been stolen from these wallets, which means almost 12 million USD. However, 484 BTC was worth 31 million USD at Bitcoin’s peak. The question arises, where did the money go? The researchers obtained that the recipients were addressed by the latest transactions of the broken wallets. They identified 466 different recipient addresses, where the top 1 received 75 BTC, and the top 5 received 140 BTC, meaning more than USD 1.5 million, and almost USD 3 million, respectively. They counted 144 BTC in total, which is far from the theoretical 484 BTC, but it still sounds like a profitable business, worth the aforementioned USD 265 cost of the investigation. After the first transaction to the top address in 2018, several transactions were initiated from that address to several recipients for 0.5 or 1 BTC, although the account still had a balance of 63.5 BTC. Researchers also found public conversations about accounts that were swept exploiting repeated nonces. A forum member called _johoe_ [claimed](https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=1431060.0) that he had collected 135 addresses that can be compromised using that technique, and 82 had been compromised already at the time of his post. He also stated that he collected 7 BTC from the broken accounts. He was willing to send the funds back to the owner after proving ownership. The researchers repeated their attack against Ethereum after collecting more than 1.7 billion ECDSA signatures. They managed to break 2 unique wallets processing 22% of their signature collection. They decided to stop the attack, considering that the cost-benefit ratio was too low.\n\n\n## Is This Still a Real Issue Now?\n\nConsidering only the results related to the Bitcoin wallets, I would say this might not be an issue anymore. The exploitable signatures were generated several years ago, perhaps with the same software that had a serious flaw, which may have already been fixed. The signatures were exploitable not because they used a pseudo-random generator during signature generation, but due to repeated nonce values. At the same time, given that digital signatures are used in so many cases, such as during a cryptographic handshake, this may still be a significant issue. Exploiting the vulnerability indeed requires getting consecutive signatures from a potentially affected server, which is not a trivial problem in the case of a busy server, as many other clients connect to a server between our consecutive connections. Even so, if an attacker manages to exploit a server, the server certificate is compromised without any sign on the server. For as much as the [certificate revocation is one of the weakest points of X.509](https://pfeifferszilard.hu/2020/09/09/why-do-certificate-revocation-checking-mechanisms-never-work.html), it is troubling that such a simple flow in an implementation can cause certificate compromise. The case would be even more worrying if there were a similar flow in certificate issuance, as this would compromise a CA, which could result in unpredictable consequences.\n\nPhoto by[ Jievani Weerasinghe](https://unsplash.com/@jievani?utm_source=unsplash&utm_medium=referral&utm_content=creditCopyText) on[ Unsplash](https://unsplash.com/photos/NHRM1u4GD_A?utm_source=unsplash&utm_medium=referral&utm_content=creditCopyText)\n","date":"2023-03-16","id":"Blogposts_36","short_description":"Researchers at Kudelski Security have managed to break Bitcoin and Ethereum wallets using a novel attack against one of the most popular asymmetric key algorithms of modern cryptography, ECDSA.","slug":"bitcoin-account-hijacking-ecdsa-nonce-break","title":"Bitcoin account hijacking using OSINT techniques"},{"author":"Szilárd Pfeiffer","avatar":{"url":"https://balasysmediastorage.blob.core.windows.net/websiteimages/uploads/christian_lendl_Zytt_G_Su_o2_E_unsplash_76adf1b110.jpg"},"content":"**Quantum computing not only poses a great opportunity, but also a great threat to internet security. According to the promises of quantum computers, certain mathematical problems that form the basis of today’s most popular cryptographic algorithms will be much easier to solve with them than with classical computers. In a recent publication, Chinese researchers claim that there is an existing algorithm that, even with today's quantum computers, makes it possible to break the RSA algorithm, which is the fundamental basis of secure internet communication. At the same time, there are doubts about the reliability of the publication. However, even if these doubts are confirmed, it does not change the fact that the security threat posed by quantum computers remains with us.**\n\nThe basic claim of the [paper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2212.12372.pdf), published last Christmas by 24 Chinese researchers, is that they have found an algorithm that enables 2,048-bit RSA keys to be broken even with the relatively low-power quantum computers available today. There is nothing really new in the fact that quantum computers pose a general risk to the reliability of cryptographic procedures that guarantee secure internet communications, such as [RSA open-key cryptography](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSA_(cryptosystem)) or the Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm. These procedures are based on mathematical problems that are practically unsolvable with conventional computers, but which can be solved in a few hours with sufficiently powerful quantum computers. Sufficiently large means 20 million [quantum bits](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qubit) (qubit) in this case. The problem with this figure of 20 million is that <span style=\"text-decoration:underline;\">IBM's quantum computer</span> – the largest quantum computer known today – can only render 433 of these 20 million qubits. It is not an exaggeration to say that the Chinese researchers chose one of the steepest hills to climb. But can they really overcome this challenge?\n\n> [Integer factorization](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Integer_factorization) is the most widely used infeasible mathematical problem to guarantee that the cryptographic algorithms are practically unbreakable. Factorizing a number consisting of only a few digits is trivial (15 = 3 * 5), but the required computational capacity grows exponentially along with the number of digits. For hundreds or even thousands of digits, the computational effort required is so enormous that even using the highest performance supercomputers, the time required to do the calculation would be similar to the lifetime of the universe. According to the [recommendation](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-57Pt3r1.pdf) of the [National Institute of Standards and Technology](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Institute_of_Standards_and_Technology) (NIST), the smallest RSA key size that can be considered secure is 2,048 bits. This means approximately 600 digits, but in many cases larger keys of 3,072 or 4,096 bits are also used. There, the number of digits expressed in the decimal number system already exceeds a thousand, meaning that these keys are practically infeasible with traditional methods. At the same time, in 1994<span style=\"text-decoration:underline;\"> [Peter Shor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peter_Shor)</span> already came up with an [algorithm](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shor%27s_algorithm) that – on a quantum computer only existing in theory at the time – would be able to perform the prime factorization with much greater efficiency than before. This breakthrough would imply that a significant part of our encryption procedures would no longer be resistant to breaking, including, among other things, HTTPS, which ensures the security of browsing, or VPN protocols, one of the foundations of remote work.\n\n## Has Cryptographic Apocalypse Now arrived?\n\nThe Chinese researchers could only provide a theoretical answer to this question, since the solution and the techniques outlined by them require a 372-qubit computer. Though this does exist within the walls of IBM,  the Chinese researchers did not have this machine at their disposal. However, they did succeed in factoring a 48-bit (15-digit) number with a 10-qubit computer. At first sight, this may not seem like much of a breakthrough, but it should be noted that this is the largest number that has ever been factored using a generic algorithm. Not to mention the fact that it was possible to put a theory into practice. The question is whether it was possible to bridge the aforementioned gap. As the correspondence between [Bruce Schneier](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bruce_Schneier) – one of the iconic figures of IT security – and [Roger A. Grimes](https://www.amazon.com/stores/Roger-A.-Grimes/author/B001IQUMT4) – the author of several books on cryptography – revealed:\n\n>“Apparently what happened is another guy who had previously announced he was able to break traditional asymmetric encryption using classical computers…but reviewers found a flaw in his algorithm and that guy had to retract his paper. But this Chinese team realized that the step that killed the whole thing could be solved by small quantum computers. So they tested and it worked.”\n\nYou might think that the cryptographic apocalypse is here.\n\n## Keep Calm and Dig Deep\n\nThe basis of the Chinese researchers’ algorithm relies on [Claus Schnorr](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Claus_P._Schnorr)'s factorization algorithm (not to be confused with [Shor’s algorithm](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shor%27s_algorithm)). The aforementioned algorithm works well with smaller numbers – with which the researchers themselves tested it – but falls apart with larger values. It is precisely this limitation that the Chinese researchers claim to have overcome. However, they do not mention any details, and they have not been able to prove the complete theory in practice due to the lack of a quantum computer with sufficient capacity. As Schneier cited the situation on his blog:\n\n> “So if it’s true that the Chinese paper depends on this Schnorr technique that doesn’t scale, the techniques in this Chinese paper won’t scale, either. (On the other hand, if it does scale then I think it also breaks a bunch of lattice-based public-key cryptosystems.)”\n\nDoes the uncertainty remain until someone tries the algorithm on a sufficiently large-capacity quantum computer? Partially.\n\nThere are, in fact, some signs that cast doubt on the whole story. One of these is that the Chinese researchers failed to win the $200,000 prize offered by the [RSA Factoring Challenge](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSA_Factoring_Challenge), which goes to whoever can successfully crack a 2048-bit RSA key. Of course, you could say that they did not have the necessary hardware, but a letter to IBM to get the prize, even if it is shared, would have been certainly worthwhile. People drawn to conspiracy theories may ask why the Chinese state did not keep the discovery for itself and started pouring money into the development of a suitable quantum computer. This would obviously cost a very substantial amount, but would also bring a very substantial benefit. At the same time, there is also strong skepticism from the scientific side. [Scott Aaronson](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scott_Aaronson) – former researcher at MIT, now at the University of Texas – made a [devastating statement on his blog](https://scottaaronson.blog/?p=6957) about the Chinese paper. Aaronson, in his pieces of research, primarily focuses on quantum computing and complexity theory, perhaps the most important fields of science concerning our topic. His three-word review about the content of the publication was: “No. Just no.” He criticized the publication in a firm tone:\n\n\n> “Then, finally, they come clean about the one crucial point in a single sentence of the Conclusion section:\n> It should be pointed out that the quantum speedup of the algorithm is unclear due to the ambiguous convergence of QAOA.\n> “Unclear” is an understatement here. It seems to me that a miracle would be required for the approach here to yield any benefit at all, compared to just running the classical Schnorr’s algorithm on your laptop. And if the latter were able to break RSA, it would’ve already done so.\n> All told, this is one of the most actively misleading quantum computing papers I’ve seen in 25 years, and I’ve seen … many.”\n\nAaronson is not alone in his opinion: [many](https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity:7016808281847336960/) [others](https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity:7017366747691241472/) criticize the research on the same basis, including Peter Shor, who says:\n\n> “There are apparently possible problems with this paper.”\n\nIt should also be highlighted that the research-sharing platform ([arχiv](https://arxiv.org/)), where the Chinese study was published, [does not perform peer reviews](https://arxiv.org/about), meaning that the mere fact of publication does not mean much, especially in such popular fields as quantum computing and cryptography. \n\n## So, are we off the hook or not?\n\nEven if we are able to recognize all the [research paper mills](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Research_paper_mill) – which must necessarily be expected in a popular and highly regarded discipline such as cryptography or quantum computing –  the harsh reality remains. Any encrypted data recorded today that uses a cryptographic process that does not withstand the challenges posed by quantum computers could become compromised in the not-too-distant future. As a result, it would be necessary to use algorithms that are thought to be secure against a cryptoanalytic attack by a quantum computer to mitigate the effect of the harvest-now-decrypt-later technique, as it cannot be eliminated. In the  case of a cryptographic problem that received great publicity, such as Heartbleed in 2014, the market reacted relatively quickly, although it was weeks before the error disappeared from the 100,000 most-visited pages. In other cases, which have not received as much publicity, it can take years, according to statistics from [Qualys Pulse](https://www.ssllabs.com/ssl-pulse/) . In other words, we cannot expect the introduction of post-quantum cryptography to happen much faster than this.\n\nThis is just like global warming: a problem that cannot be dealt with in the future when it becomes critical. It should be dealt with in the present. The similarity is striking if we consider the fact that scientists have been scaring people with horror stories about quantum computers for decades. What seemed like a theory for a while, has now become the reality. [IBM promises a one-thousand-qubit computer](https://www.science.org/content/article/ibm-promises-1000-qubit-quantum-computer-milestone-2023) by the end of the year, and [Google a one-million-qubit one](https://www.cnet.com/tech/computing/google-plans-to-build-a-practical-quantum-computer-by-2029-at-new-center/) by the end of the decade. The latter does not promise anything good, since it is only a question of data storage capacity – how much data can be accessed after RSA becomes breakable. The first to have machines with sufficient capacity will presumably be the still much-criticized technology giants, and the most powerful states. Lawmakers still call for encryption backdoors [from time](https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2017/06/20/eu-encryption-law/) [to time](https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2021/04/05/weak-encryption/), despite the [warnings](https://balasys.eu/blogs/weakened-encryption-is-a-silver-bullet-not-just-for-law-enforcement-agencies-but-for-cybercriminals) about the [serious risks involved](https://pfeifferszilard.hu/2021/02/25/cryptography-weakening-a-tale-of-the-law-abiding-criminal.html), but with such a technical breakthrough, they would not necessarily need to do so. However, this may have consequences that are difficult to foresee both for privacy and the outcomes of conflicts that are increasingly transferred to cyberspace.","date":"2023-02-20","id":"Blogposts_35","short_description":"In a recent publication, Chinese researchers claim that there is an existing algorithm that, even with today's quantum computers, makes it possible to break the RSA algorithm, which is the fundamental basis of secure internet communication. At the same time, there are doubts about the reliability of the publication.","slug":"chinese-researchers-rsa-is-breakable-others-do-not-panic","title":"Chinese researchers: RSA is breakable. Others: Do not panic! "},{"author":"László Horváth, Pre-Sales Engineer at Balasys","avatar":{"url":"https://balasysmediastorage.blob.core.windows.net/websiteimages/uploads/code_1839406_1280_48de8cd8f8.jpg"},"content":"*WAF-as-a-service solutions are becoming an increasingly popular method for protecting websites and services running in the cloud. One significant advantage is the vendors' claim that security settings can be updated in time based on the data from incoming attacks that are caught. However, the question arises: how effective and inevitable are current WAFs and WAF-as-a-service solutions?*\n\nIt is essential to address this issue as injection attacks are a prominent feature in the periodic OWASP Top 10 list, ranking 1st in 2013 and 2017 and 3rd in 2021, after broken access control and cryptographic failures. \n\n\n## Autospear: the new generation of SQL attacks \n\nAt the Black Hat Asia conference in May, researchers from Zhejiang University in China presented a new automated SQLi method for testing and bypassing signature-based WAFs. The method consists of using algorithms to modify the code originally intended to be injected – which is detected and blocked by firewalls by default – until it cannot be detected using the negative security model. \n\nThe modifications were as follows: \n\n| MODIFICATION  | EXAMPLE  |\n| ---  | ---  |\n| Case Swapping  | or 1 = 1 → oR 1 = 1  |\n| Whitespace Substitution  | or 1 = 1 → \\tor1\\n=1  |\n| Comment Injection  | or 1 = 1 → /\\*foo\\*/or 1 =/\\*bar\\*/1  |\n| Comment Rewriting  | /\\*foo\\*/or 1 = 1 → /\\*1.png\\*/or 1 = 1  |\n| Integer Encoding  | or 1 = 1 → or 0x1 = 1  |\n| Operator Swapping  | or 1 = 1 → or 1 like 1  |\n| Logical Invariant  | or 1 = 1 → or 1 = 1 and 'a' = 'a'  |\n| Inline Comment  | or 1 = 1 → /\\*!or/ 1 = 1<br>union select → /\\*!union\\*/ /\\*!50000select\\*/  |\n| Where Rewriting  | where xxx → where xxx and True<br>where xxx → where (select 0) or xxx  |\n| DML Substitution  | or 1 = 1 → \\|\\| 1 = 1 <br>and name = 'foo‘ → && name = 'foo'  |\n| Tautology Substitution  | 1 = 1 → ‘foo’ = ‘foo’<br>‘1’ = ‘1‘ → 2 <> 3 <br>1 = 1 → (select ord(’r’) regexp 114) = 0x1  |\n\nThe point of the modifications, in this case, is that the SQL command will not change semantically, and the database server will be able to process it, but the signature-based protection can be bypassed. To do this, an algorithm is used that systematically maps which modifications can be run by trial and error and uses the feedback to design the code for the final attack. \n\nThe researchers tested the method on seven popular web application firewalls, four of which are available on Amazon Web Services as WAF-as-a-service. They focused on four types of requests (GET / GET(JSON) / POST / POST(JSON) and generated 10,000 unique codes from 100 known SQLi expressions. \n\nThe results suggest that WAF-as-a-service solutions can be attacked with high effectiveness, as there were vendors with 89% or more success using JSON payload. \n \n\n## Positive security model: protection against Autospear and other attacks\n\nThe positive security model has often been criticized for being more time-consuming and complex – and therefore more costly – to develop than the signature-based model. Still, it can provide much more effective protection against Autospear and similar attacks. With a properly designed and maintained API schema, the acceptable incoming data in a given field can be limited to the point where any modification that does not contain the expected data will immediately block the call. For example, in a userid field, you can specify precisely where and what characters are expected, their length, and composition. \n\nThis takes time and expertise, and needs to be tailored to the specific API in each case. It is not a switch that, when flipped, can give a false sense of security that you are protected against OWASP Top10 vulnerabilities. \n\nAnother severe criticism is that the positive security model gives too many false positives, though this problem can be avoided using expert-created and maintained templates and continuous feedback during testing. \n\nHowever, a proper API security solution can help you to build your positive security model effectively. It is essential to ensure proper logging is in place during the development and testing phase. This can help you picture what your core traffic consists of and what vulnerabilities exist. A positive security model also enables you to test existing – or possibly missing – traffic-based schemes under controlled conditions. You can provide appropriate feedback to your developers by filtering out any calls that may occur that do not conform to the scheme. This can be recorded in log files in a developer environment with accurate feedback without interrupting the call. In a live system, you can immediately cut off the call without feedback or send a misleading message to the attacker. ","date":"2022-11-30","id":"Blogposts_33","short_description":"Web Application Firewalls (WAFs) are widely used to protect websites and APIs against various attacks, such as SQL injection (SQLi) and cross-site-scripting (XSS). ","slug":"weaknesses-of-signature-based-api-protection","title":"Weaknesses of signature-based API protection"}]}},"pageContext":{"slug":"zero-trust-is-it-anything-new"}},
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